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COMMENTS
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE TO LEASES
Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp.,
244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
Sawyer, an independent grocer, leased an ice machine from Pioneer
Leasing Corporation for a non-cancellable term of five years. The
lease provided, among other things, that the lessee was responsible for
all repairs, that the machine was to be returned to the lessor at the end
of the term, and that all warranties were expressly disclaimed.1
During negotiation of the lease, an agent of Pioneer2 told Sawyer
that the apparatus was winterized and would produce 400 pounds of
ice per day. Sawyer, who wished to buy the machine, was told that the
leasing agreement was tantamount to a purchase. 3 This statement was
later confirmed by an officer of Pioneer. After functioning properly for
about six months, the machine collapsed during the first period of cold
weather. Sawyer twice summoned mechanics, but neither was able to
1. The lease set up a 60-month payment schedule of $45.32 per month with the first
and last four payments payable at the time of the signing of the contract in the amount
of $226.60.
Other relevant provisions of the agreement included:
[Section 8] "... At the expiration of the terms of this lease for any item(s) leased
hereunder, Lessee shall immediately redeliver such item(s) at Lessor's place of business
or such other reasonable place as Lessor may designate within the State where the
item(s) was leased, in like condition as it was received, less normal wear, tear and
depreciation; properly crated with freight prepaid."
Section 9 [which provides] .... inter alia, that in case of default in payment for a
period of ten days, lessor was authorized to take immediate possession of the leased
property, and that the lessee shall remain liable for the payment of the total rental,
all such rental being immediately due and payable." Both pages of the instrument
provide, "This lease cannot be cancelled."
Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1968).
2. This case also raised an agency problem which the court resolved in Sawyer's favor.
Pioneer alleged, both at the trial and appellate level, that as Barnett was not an em-
ployee of the corporation and as he had handled all the proceedings in connection with
execution of the lease, Pioneer was not liable on the contract with Sawyer. The trial
court found for Pioneer on this point, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that as
the lease was subsequently executed by the president of the lessor corporation and because
the lessor had accepted over $600 in payments from the lessee, the question as to whether
Barnett was the agent of the lessor should have been submitted to the jury. Sawyer v.
Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968).
3. Sawyer testified that Barnett had explained to him that the transaction was "just
like buying a car, after you make so many payments, it is your box." Sawyer v. Pioneer
Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1968).
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repair the machine. When Sawyer notified Pioneer of the breakdown
and stopped making payments, it brought suit to recover the balance
due on the lease.
Sawyer defended on the theory that, despite the broad disclaimer, the
lease was accompanied by an implied warranty of fitness, upon which
he had relied. He argued that the misrepresentation of the durability
and capacity of the machine and its unfitness for its intended purpose
constituted a breach of the warranty. The trial court directed a verdict
for Pioneer, but the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed on appeal.4
Although the court specifically held the transaction to be a lease
rather than a sale, it concluded that Section 2-316 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code5 is applicable to leases which are analogous to sales. This
section requires disclaimers of implied warranties of fitness to be made
in writing and conspicuous. 6 The court found that the disclaimer pro-
vision under examination was not conspicuous. This direct applica-
tion to leases of the UCC sales provisions seems unjustified, both as a
matter of interpretive technique and as adding unnecessary confusion
to contract law.
Although it failed to unearth direct support for the application of
UCC provisions to leases which are analogous to sales, the court bor-
4. Id.
5. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-316 (Add. 1961).
6. The Code provision, which was enacted without changes by the Arkansas legislature
in 1961, reads in full:
(I) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranties shall be construed wherever reasonable
as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol
or extrinsic evidence (section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the
extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchant-
ibility or any part of it the language must mention merchantibility and in case of
a writing must be conspicuous and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fit-
ness the exclusion must be made in writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude
all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are
no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by
expression like "as is, with all faults" or other language which in common under-
standing calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warrenties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined goods or the
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there
is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or
course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual
modification of remedy.
AkK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-2-718, -719 (Add. 1961).
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rowed arguments from three sources to bolster its conclusion. The
opinion quotes extensively from "Implied Warranties in Non-Sales
Cases," an article by Professor E. A. Farnsworth, 7 and finds this to be
"respectable authority" for its holding.8 Professor Farnsworth argues
that the existence of a sale is not a prerequisite to the implication of a
warranty, asserting that such warranties are justified when goods are
supplied under non-sale conditions if the reliance upon the supplier
of the goods is similar to that in sales.! The writer concludes that:
... there is respectable authority for the extension of implied
warranties to non-sales cases, in spite of a tendency to overlook the
possibility. In borderline cases reasoning by analogy to sales law
... is preferable to categorization of the contract as one of sale and
direct application of the sales statute.10
It seems dear that, rather than advocating application of code pro-
visions to non-sales transactions, Farnsworth is urging recognition of
the advantages of reasoning by analogy from uniform acts in order to
provide criteria for the resolution of non-sales cases. 1 Indeed, it would
appear that the author's primary concern is that the codification of
sales laws might have a deadening effect on the development of case
law in non-sales areas.12
After noting that the precise issue involved had been previously
raised but had gone undecided, 3 the court next sought support in
dictum from the New Jersey case of Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing.4
The Cintrone case-an action in tort, not contract-held that the com-
mon law doctrine of implied warranties applied to leases. The New
Jersey court recognized that a drafters' Comment to UCC Section 2-313
disavows any intent to disturb case law holding that warranties need
not be confined to sales transactions.' 5 From this, however, it does not
7. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLuM. L. REv.
653, 656-57 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Farnsworth].
8. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 52 (1968).
9. Farnsworth at 669-74.
10. Id. at 667.
11. Id. at 667-69.
12. Farnsworth at 654. This article has been extensively cited in cases extending pro-
visions of uniform laws, especially the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and the
Uniform Commercial Code, to areas in which they do not technically apply. See, e.g.,
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
13. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 53 (1968). The case
referred to was Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Colonial Aluminum Sales, Inc., 3 UCC Rep. 858,
859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
14. 45 NJ. 434, 447, 212 A.2d 769, 775 (1965).
15. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 447, 212 A.2d 769,
775 (1965). It should be noted that the position suggested in this case has not been fol-
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follow that the UCC provisions affecting warranties were intended to
apply with equal force to non-sales situations. More tenable is the posi-
tion that the authors of the Code intended that the development of
leasing warranties be left to case law, with the recognition that the
policies of the UCC would be useful in the resolution of such cases.
Finally, the court observed that Section 2-102 delineates the scope of
Article 2 in terms of "transactions in goods"' 6 and that Section 2-202
avoids direct reference to sales.T The court then reasoned that, since a
lease of a chattel is a transaction in goods, such leases should fall within
the provisions of the Code. It should be noted, however, that Section
2-105(l) defines "goods" in terms of a contract for sale.'$ Thus, the
requirement of a sale is indirectly incorporated into permissible scope
of application. Other weaknesses inhering in the majority's position
are emphasized in Justice Fogleman's dissent.' 9 The sections in ques-
lowed in New Jersey. See Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967);
Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967); Conroy v. 10
Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (1967). U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2
states in part:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties made
by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty sections of this
Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to
the direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other appropriate circum-
stances such as in the case of bailments for hire, whether such bailment is itself
the main contract or is merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the
sale of their contents .... Beyond that, the matter is left to the case law with the
intention that the policies of this Article may offer useful guidance in dealing with
further cases as they arise.
16. The relevant portion of U.C.C. § 2-102 (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-102 (Add. 1961))
reads:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in goods;
it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an unconditional
contract to sell . . . is intended to operate only as a security transfer nor does this
Article impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other
specified classes of buyers.
17. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 52 (1968). U.C.C.
§ 2-202 (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-202 (Add. 1961)) reads:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression
of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by the course of
performance (Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms
unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
18. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-105(1) (Add. 1961)), the relevant portion
of which reads:
"Goods" means all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification to
the contract of sale .... (Emphasis added).
19. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 54 (1968).
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tion refer specifically to contracts of sale and to buyers and sellers; 0
this wording would seem to render these sections inapplicable to leas-
ing contracts. Moreover, at least three sections of the Code refer spe-
cifically to leases,21 fostering the conclusion that, where the drafters
intended that it should apply to leases, such intent is expressly stated.
This analysis suggests that the Arkansas court has expanded the ap-
plication of a specific statutory provision to encompass a class of cases
which the legislature never intended it to include. Before discussing
the practical problems left in the wake of this decision, it is appropriate
to consider alternative methods by which a similar but sounder result
could have been achieved.
Commercial transactions which bear the undeniable flavor of a sale
can in some cases be held to be sales in fact. Courts are not bound by
the labels which businessmen assign to their contracts, 22 and they will
attempt to ascertain the true intent of the parties.2 A sale by any name
will be subject to Article 2 of the UCC, for any other rule would allow
evasion of the statute simply by retitling the documents involved.
The provisions for non-cancellation 24 and the lessee's responsibility
for maintenance25 contained in the Sawyer contract have sometimes
been viewed as evidence of a sale rather than a lease. This is especially
persuasive when, as here, the aggregate rental costs approximate the
sale price of the chattel. On this basis, the Arkansas court could have
considered the transaction a sale. In this case, however, such a conclu-
sion would be attenuated for two reasons. First, non-cancellation and
lessee's responsibility for maintenance are neither solely referable to
a sale nor incompatible with a lease. In those cases where these ele-
ments aided the finding of a sale, other factors were present which are
absent in the instant case.2 6 Secondly, the Sawyer lease stated that the
20. U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -316 (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-2-313 to 85-2-316 (Add. 1961)).
21. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(2), 9-105(1)(h).
22. See Tishman Equipment Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23, 28, 202 A.2d 504, 507
(1964).
23. Id. at 29, 202 A.2d at 507, wherein the court states that:
In the determination of actual intent and purpose of the transaction, the negotia-
tions surrounding it may properly be considered....
24. See Southwestern Truck Sales S. Rental Co. v. Johnson, 165 Neb. 407, 416, 85
N.W.2d 705, 710 (1957).
25. See American Can Co. v. U.S. Canning Corp., 12 Misc. 2d 750, 755, 170 N.Y.S.2d 727,
732 (Manhattan Mun. Ct. 1958).
26. American Can Co. v. U.S. Canning Corp., 12 Misc. 2d 750, 170 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Man-
hattan Mun. Ct. 1958) (responsibility for maintenance coupled with a written attached
conditional sales contract); Southwestern Truck Sales & Rental Co. v. Johnson, 165 Neb.
407, 85 N.W.2d 705 (1957) (dominant theme of agreement was lessor getting full benefits
of lease coupled with no set term for the lease to run).
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machine was to be returned to the lessor upon the expiration of the
term.27 This suggests that equitable title, the passage of which is essen-
tial to a finding of a conditional sale,28 did not pass to Sawyer under
this instrument. Judicial rhetoric notwithstanding, courts should be
loath to recast an agTeement on the basis of isolated promises which
only arguably change the character of the contract.2 Therefore, it is
submitted that, while the Sawyer court could have held this agreement
to be a sale, it was correct in refusing to do so.
A second alternative route by which the Sawyer result could have
been reached is reasoning by analogy from the UCG provisions, as
advocated by the Farnsworth article.30 This technique recognizes that
uniform code legislation presents unusually fertile ground in which
search for broad legislative policies need not be confined to the
scope of statutes which manifest them. The liberal warranty provisions
of the Code3' and the requirement that effective disclaimers must be
written and conspicuous 32 were engendered by the realization that the
recipient of goods in a commercial transaction must often rely on the
supplier's skill and judgment in providing goods suited for their in-
tended purpose.33 Legal niceties in this area, such as the allowance of
vague "fine print disclaimers," would bait many traps for the unwary
businessman. The fact that law makers have chosen to codify this
policy with regard to sales contracts should encourage, rather than
dissuade, courts to apply similar reasoning when faced with identical
dangers in non-sales situations. The courts which have adopted this
technique are to be applauded.34 This, however, is not reasoning by
27. See note I supra.
28. See Tishman Equipment Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23, 28, 202 A.2d 504, 507
(1964).
29. Id.; Burton v. Tatelbaum, 240 Md. 280, 213 A.2d 875 (1965).
30. Farnsworth, supra note 7.
31. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -318.
32. tI.C.C. § 2-316.
33. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-315, comment I.
34. See Stern & Co. v. State Loan 9. Fin. Corp., 238 F. Supp. 901 (D. Del. 1965) (holding
that U.C.C. § 2-105 which embodies the parol evidence rule may be applied by analogy
in order to interpret contracts for the sale of investment securities, although such
securities are not specifically mentioned in the section); Transatlantic Financing Corp.
v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that the principles set out in U.C.C.
§§ 2-614 and 2-615 as to impossibility or improbability and substituted performance in
sales contracts may be applied to analogous situations such as transport charters); Hunt
Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 49 Misc. 2d 246, 267 N.Y.S.2d 364, rev'd on other
grounds, 26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966) (holding that the principles set out
in U.C.C. §§ 2-102 and 2-202 which, in terms, are only applicable to goods, have policy
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analogy as the Arkansas court understood it. The analogies in Sawyer
were drawn between sales contracts and the lease in question, and once
the similarity was verified, the court applied the specific Code provision
rather than the policy underlying it. True, many broadly stated sec-
tions of the UCC are little more than the enunciation of a policy, but
other sections are phrased with great specificity. The fact that parties
to a non-sales transaction have not met the letter of the sales provisions
of the UCC should not give courts cause to declare the agreement a
nullity if the parties have conducted their business in a manner which
serves the policies as well. Certainly, an extension of common law based
on an expression of legislative intent is preferable to inclusion by ju-
dicial legislation.
As is often the case when judicial action is unsupported by theoret-
ical justification, two problems of a more practical nature now confront
Arkansas lessors. The court held that Section 2-316(2) will apply to
leases "where the provisions of the lease are analogous to a sale,"35 but
it failed adequately to discuss what kinds of provisions will cause the
analogy to be drawn. The factors most influential on the court were
(1) the imposition upon the lessee of the duty to repair and maintain
the machine, (2) the non-cancellable term, and (3) a vague oral option
to buy. When these are present, the court finds that "the transaction
really seems to be a sale in every respect, except for the fact that the
instrument provided that the ice machine should be returned to the
lessor."381 Whether all of these are required and whether the same
result would obtain if other provisions were substituted are questions
which the lessor must resolve at his peril.
After stating that its holding leaves all other Code provisions un-
affected, the court inquired, "After all, what legitimate objection can
be made to using type (for the disclaimer) that is conspicuous?" 37 But
considerations underlying them that are an appropriate criterion in determining other
contract situations, in that case, an option for the sale of stock).
These "analogy cases" seem to share two basic premises. First, that while the Code does
not provide all the answers to the multitude of intricacies which may possibly arise
in commercial transactions, one of the uniform laws' intended purposes is to serve as a
guide in resolving disputes not within its express provisions. And, secondly, that the
process of reasoning by analogy lays bare the real reasons for the existence of the Code,
reasons which could be too easily obscured if judicial decisions came to rest ultimately
upon the denomination of a particular business transaction.
These cases, unlike Sawyer, also attempt to offer additional support for their decisions
by reasoning from basic contract law.
35. Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, -, 428 S.W.2d 46, 54 (1968).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the justice of this result should not be allowed to obscure its short-
comings. Not only must the lessor now be appraised that a single Code
provision-not apposite on its face-will be applied to his contract, he
must protect himself by attempting to divine which additional pro-
visions of the sales law the courts may later feel constrained to super-
impose upon his transactions. To answer that this lessor may fully
protect himself merely by complying with the relevant sections of
Article 2 begs the question. The businessman should notlegally be
held to a higher standard than the legislature requires of him.
It is submitted that the Arkansas court, while reaching what was
surely a just result, did so at the sacrifice of the clarity and stability
which uniform commercial laws were designed to promote. It is possi-
ble that the Sawyer decision could lead to the indiscriminate applica-
tion of Uniform Commercial Code provisions to leases-a result hav-
ing the potential to introduce chaos into commercial transactions in
Arkansas. It is more likely that this decision will herald the selective
application of Code sections to non-sales transactions-a result almost
equally burdensome upon Arkansas businessmen. The alternatives
suggested present problems of their own, but they would afford rem-
edies to those in Sawyer's situation without seriously undermining the
purpose and effectiveness of the uniform commercial laws.
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